यदि Articles 25/26 में 'morality' को 'Public Morality' के रूप में पढ़ा जाए तो Majoritarian Notions जीतेंगे : Raju Ramachandran In Sabarimala Reference

<p>In the Sabarimala reference, Senior Advocate Raju Ramachandran has argued that the term 'morality' under Articles 25 and 26 can't be read as societal or public morality. He stated that giving the term such meaning would open doors for religious freedoms to be curtailed based on majoritarian views.</p><p>He said: "If morality as used under Articles 25 and 26 were to be read as social/societal/public morality, this would open the door for religious freedoms to be curtailed on the basis of majoritarian notions which are untethered to constitutional text, and that this would result in an even more amorphous judicial inquiry."</p><p>In his arguments presented before the 9-judge bench last week, he submitted that morality means internal principles which are based on different views and circumstances, and can shift over time.</p><p>"The Constitution cannot restrict any fundamental freedom based on an irrational majoritarian sentiment. Neither can any “religious” understanding of morality be imported to restrict religious freedoms, since that would render the word “morality” irrelevant. Understanding morality in the context of the Constitutional principles is the only consistent, rational, and lawful way to restrict fundamental freedoms."</p><p>Ramachandran, who appeared for a reformist Dawoodi Bohra group(Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra community) against the practice of excommunication, remarked that the Court doesn't have to focus so much on terminology as to whether it should be called constitutional morality, constitutional ethos, or constitutional arrangement; at the end of the day, it is nothing but the internal morality of the Constitution.</p><p>"The notion of constitutional morality may be called by multiple names, including “the ethos of the Constitution” or “the conscience of the Constitution”. The phrase used to signify this reference to constitutional values is less important than the function performed by this phrase - which is to adjudicate fundamental rights claims through a value-based approach."</p><p>Chief Justice of India Surya Kant asked whether constitutional morality could be placed on a higher pedestal than other constitutional values and used as a test to strike down legislation. Ramachandran responded that it can't be used as a test but as a tool to aid in guiding the interpretation of fundamental rights.</p><p>Ramachandran argued that the practice of excommunication runs contrary to morality, a limitation under Article 26, because it's an essentially regressive practice which causes 'civil death' of the excommunicated person by mandating a social and economic boycott.</p><p>"It is clearly in violation of any standard of morality based on the principles of equality, liberty, and dignity of the individual, and therefore cannot be protected under Article 26(b) or Article 25(1)."</p><p>Excommunication may be prima facie religious, but it causes civil death</p><p>Ramachandran remarked that he is not against religious denomination