Overview of Counter‑Maoist Measures Former senior security adviser K. Vijay Kumar , a retired 1975‑batch IPS officer and ex‑Director General of the CRPF , explains that the approach to tackling Maoism has remained broadly consistent across Congress and BJP administrations. The most challenging phase was 2006‑2009, after which a decisive push began, culminating in Home Minister Amit Shah 's deadline of 31 March 2026 to eliminate Left Wing Extremism (LWE). Key Developments (2006‑2026) 2010: After the killing of 76 security personnel in Chhattisgarh, former Home Minister P. Chidambaram secured central funds for anti‑Maoist operations. 2011: CRPF designated as a “patch force” with authority across state borders and given a dedicated intelligence wing. 2014‑15: Under National Security Adviser Ajit Doval , training programmes for tribal youth in Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand were expanded. 2022‑2026: Discretionary funds allocated to about 200 district collectors to improve police mobility; example – procurement of 30‑40 vehicles in Bijapur district. 2024‑2025: Formation of special forces units (3,000‑4,000 personnel) comprising trained tribal youths and surrendered Maoist cadres. Important Facts Funding: Central assistance enabled procurement of vehicles and communication equipment, often delivered by helicopter to remote areas. Human‑rights allegations: Kumar asserts that 99.99% of complaints against security forces are false, describing them as psychological operations to demoralise troops. Women and child cadres: Maoist women are reported to be better trained than men; child cadres are noted for keen observation and ruthlessness. Institutional continuity: The same strategic framework persisted across successive governments, with incremental improvements in training, equipment, and inter‑agency coordination. UPSC Relevance The article touches upon several GS‑2 themes: internal security architecture ( MHA ), the role of paramilitary forces ( CRPF ), and the functioning of the District Collector . Understanding the evolution of counter‑insurgency policy aids answers on security challenges, federal‑state coordination, and the impact of political leadership on internal security. Way Forward Strengthen intelligence sharing between MHA , state police, and paramilitary agencies. Expand community‑centric development programmes in Naxal‑affected districts to address socio‑economic grievances. Institutionalise transparent monitoring of human‑rights complaints to counter misinformation. Continue capacity‑building of tribal youth through skill‑training and livelihood schemes, reducing recruitment potential for Maoist groups. By maintaining policy continuity while adapting tactics, the government aims to meet the 2026 deadline and restore lasting peace in the affected regions.