<p>On the fifth day of the <strong>Sabarimala reference hearing</strong> (2026), <strong>Senior Advocate Rajeev Dhavan</strong> argued that the prevailing "essential religious practice" test is constitutionally unsafe. He urged the nine‑judge bench of the <span class="key-term" data-definition="Supreme Court of India — apex judicial body that interprets the Constitution and adjudicates disputes on fundamental rights (GS2: Polity)">Supreme Court</span> to adopt a simpler "bona‑fide belief" standard under <span class="key-term" data-definition="Article 25 — guarantees freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess, practice and propagate religion, subject to public order, morality and health (GS2: Polity)">Article 25</span> and <span class="key-term" data-definition="Article 26 — provides institutions the right to manage their own affairs, including property and administration, subject only to public order, morality and health (GS2: Polity)">Article 26</span>. His submission touches on several landmark judgments and doctrinal principles that are vital for UPSC aspirants.</p> <h2>Key Developments</h2> <ul> <li>Dhavan contended that the Court should assess whether a belief is <span class="key-term" data-definition="bona‑fide belief — a genuine, sincerely held conviction, irrespective of its rationality, relevant to constitutional scrutiny of religious freedom (GS2: Polity)">bona‑fide</span>, not whether it is "essential".</li> <li>He cited <span class="key-term" data-definition="Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala (1986) — Supreme Court case protecting Jehovah's Witness children who refused to sing the national anthem, establishing the primacy of genuine belief (GS2: Polity)">Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala (1986)</span> as precedent.</li> <li>Reference was made to the English case <span class="key-term" data-definition="R. (Williamson) v Secretary of State for Education and Employment (2005) — held that courts may examine the genuineness of a claimant's religious belief but not its truth (GS2: Polity)">R. (Williamson)</span>, reinforcing the limited inquiry approach.</li> <li>Dhavan advocated applying the <span class="key-term" data-definition="Doctrine of proportionality — a test that balances the restriction of a right against the objective sought, ensuring the least restrictive means (GS2: Polity)">doctrine of proportionality</span> to harmonise Articles 25 and 26.</li> <li>He criticised the majority’s addition of an "exclusive distinctiveness" test in the <span class="key-term" data-definition="Sabarimala judgment (2018) — Supreme Court decision that lifted the ban on women of menstruating age entering the Sabarimala temple, invoking constitutional morality (GS2: Polity)">Sabarimala judgment</span>, calling for its overruling.</li> </ul> <h2>Important Facts</h2> <p>The bench hearing the reference comprised <strong>CJI Surya Kant</strong> and Justices <strong>BV Nagarathna</strong>, <strong>MM Sundresh</strong>, <strong>Ahsanuddin Amanullah</strong>, <strong>Aravind Kumar</strong>, <strong>Augustine George Masih</strong>, <strong>Prasanna B. Varale</strong>, <strong>R. Mahadevan</strong> and <strong>Joymalya Bagchi</strong>. Dhavan argued that the phrase "nothing in this article" of <span class="key-term" data-definition="Article 25(2) — clause that allows the State to make laws for public order, morality, health, or other provisions, ensuring social reform does not clash with religious freedom (GS2: Polity)">Article 25(2)</span> should be read expansively to prevent individual rights from obstructing social reforms. He also maintained that <span class="key-term" data-definition="Article 26(b) — right of a religious denomination to manage its own affairs, including property and administration (GS2: Polity)">Article 26(b)</span> is a sovereign institutional right, not subordinate to Article 25.</p> <h2>UPSC Relevance</h2> <ul> <li>Understanding the balance between <span class="key-term" data-definition="constitutional morality — the principle that constitutional values, not majoritarian sentiment, guide the interpretation of rights (GS2: Polity)">constitutional morality</span> and individual religious liberty is essential for GS2 questions on fundamental rights.</li> <li>The debate illustrates how the judiciary interprets "essential religious practice"—a concept frequently examined in past Supreme Court rulings (e.g., <span class="key-term" data-definition="Sri Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore (1958) — early case on the relationship between Articles 25 and 26 (GS2: Polity)">Devaru case</span>).</li> <li>Dhavan’s reliance on comparative jurisprudence (UK case) underscores the importance of cross‑jurisdictional analysis for comparative law topics.</li> </ul> <h2>Way Forward</h2> <p>Dhavan proposes a two‑pronged approach: (i) replace the "essential practice" test with a "bona‑fide belief" standard, and (ii) interpret Articles 25 and 26 together through the <span class="key-term" data-definition="proportionality test — assesses whether a restriction on a right is suitable, necessary and the least restrictive means to achieve a legitimate aim (GS2: Polity)">proportionality test</span>. If the bench adopts this framework, future disputes over temple entry, gender equality, and religious reforms could be resolved with clearer constitutional guidance, aligning individual rights with social objectives while preserving institutional autonomy.</p>