Vijay Gokhale, former Foreign Secretary, analyses how China blends military, economic and propaganda tools to pursue political goals rather than pure territorial gains. His book examines the 1958 Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, the 1962 war with India and the 2020 LAC standoff, showing a pattern of "grey zone coercion" that aligns with global power shifts.
Key Developments
- After 1979 China avoided hot wars, preferring continuous tension using military and non‑military levers.
- In 1958, China exploited US distraction in West Asia to pressure Taiwan, aiming to force US engagement rather than outright conquest.
- The 1962 India‑China war was driven by political objectives—neutralising India as a rival—while domestic turmoil from the Great Leap Forward gave Mao a pretext for external conflict.
- In 2020, heightened Quad activities and a US‑India summit prompted China to employ military pressure along the Line of Actual Control (LAC).
Important Facts
China views every bilateral dispute through a global lens. Whether confronting the US in the Taiwan Strait or India in the Himalayas, Beijing assesses how the outcome reshapes the international balance of power. Domestic politics, such as Mao’s need to rally the Party after the famine, often provide the catalyst for external aggression.
China’s strategic aim has consistently been to keep India in a neutral stance, avoiding a "two‑front conflict" scenario. When China feels strong internationally, it resorts to coercion (e.g., 1962 war, 1987 Sumdorong Chu crisis, 2020 LAC standoff). When weaker, it offers di