Judicial Accountability and the Removal Process: Analyzing the Judges (Inquiry) Act

The reconstitution of the panel to probe Justice Yashwant Varma by the Lok Sabha Speaker brings back into focus the rigorous constitutional and statutory framework governing the removal of judges in India. Under Article 124(4) for the Supreme Court and Article 217 for High Courts, a judge can only be removed on the grounds of 'proved misbehaviour or incapacity.' The process is intentionally cumbersome to safeguard judicial independence from executive or legislative overreach. The Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968, provides the operational procedure. Once a motion is admitted by the Speaker (Lok Sabha) or Chairman (Rajya Sabha), a three-member committee is formed—comprising a Supreme Court judge, a Chief Justice of a High Court, and a distinguished jurist. This committee acts as a fact-finding body. The significance of this specific case lies in the procedural continuity; when a Lok Sabha dissolves, the motion does not lapse, and the Speaker must ensure the probe continues. This highlights the institutional nature of the inquiry rather than a political one. However, the rarity of successful removals in Indian history (none to date) raises questions about whether the high threshold, while protecting independence, inadvertently creates a lack of accountability for mid-level judicial misconduct. Aspirants should view this through the lens of 'Checks and Balances' where the legislature holds the power to remove, but only after a judicial-led inquiry proves the charges.