Overview The Jain trusts have moved the Supreme Court in the ongoing Sabarimala reference . Their submissions contend that regulation of religious rites must be decided only by the faithful of that faith and that a non‑adherent cannot file a public interest litigation (PIL) to question another religion’s customs. Key Developments Jain organisations argue that matters concerning the internal authority of a religion fall squarely under Article 25 and should not be adjudicated by the State unless a dispute cannot be resolved internally. They assert that the word “practice” (not “worship”) in Article 25 expands protection to rites, ceremonies, administration of places of worship and daily religious life. The petitioners cite the Shirur Mutt decision, claiming the term “essential” has no constitutional basis and should be discarded. They propose that Articles 25 and 26 be recognised as part of the basic structure , linking them with Articles 14, 19 and 21. The petitioners differentiate between sacred sites (which cannot be acquired by the State) and properties merely dedicated to a place of worship (which may be acquired under limited circumstances). They argue that “morality” in Articles 25‑26 should not be equated with “constitutional morality”, warning against a paternalistic judicial approach. Important Facts 1. The petition was filed by Gitarth Ganga, Jyot, Shree Tapagacchiya Atma Kamal Labdhisurishwarji Jain Gyan Mandir Trust and other Jain bodies, with senior advocate Krishnan Venugopal handling the intervention. 2. A nine‑judge bench is slated to hear the matter from 7 April 2026 . 3. The All India Muslim Personal Law Board has earlier submitted a similar stance, emphasizing that courts should not decide what is “essential” to any religion. UPSC Relevance The case touches upon several core GS‑2 topics: the balance between Article 26 and state power, the interpretation of “essential religious practice”, and the doctrine of basic structure. Understanding these concepts is crucial for answering questions on religious freedom, secularism, and judicial review. Additionally, the debate on “constitutional morality” versus “personal morality” is frequently examined in ethics (GS‑4) and law‑related essays. Way Forward • Courts may need to delineate a clear test for when state legislation can intrude on religious practice, focusing on the six grounds in Article 25 rather than the vague “essential” criterion. • A possible judicial pronouncement that Articles 25‑26 form part of the basic structure could strengthen the protection of religious autonomy while preserving the secular character of the Constitution. • Legislators should craft any regulation of religious institutions narrowly, ensuring it addresses public order, health, morality or other constitutional safeguards without over‑reaching into doctrinal matters.