Supreme Court Hearings Sabarimala Case: ERP Doctrine, Court’s Theological Role & Morality

Overview The Sabarimala case is in its twelfth day of hearing (May 6, 2026). The bench of nine judges is examining three core issues: the scope of ERP , whether a civil court can act as a theological arbiter, and how “morality” under Article 25(1) should be interpreted. Key Developments (as of May 2026) Justice B V Nagarathna ruled that religious practice cannot be used to exclude specific castes, calling such exclusion “not religion”. Solicitor General Tushar Mehta contended that courts should not decide what is “superstition” because religious sensibilities differ across regions. The bench revisited precedents such as Commissioner of Police v Acharya Jagadisharananda Avadhuta (2004) and the Shayara Bano decision to gauge whether a practice is essential. Important Facts & Judicial Tests The ERP test asks whether the removal of a practice would fundamentally alter the religion’s character. Earlier cases – Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments v Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar (1954) , Sri Venkataramana Devaru v State of Mysore (1958) , and Durgah Committee, Ajmer v Syed Hussain Ali (1961) – have shaped this doctrine. The Supreme Court has distinguished “essential” rites from “superstitious beliefs” and “extraneous accretions”. Article 25(1) limits religious freedom to the grounds of public order, public morality , and health. Debates continue on whether “public morality” should be read as constitutional morality or as a separate, mutable standard. UPSC Relevance Understanding ERP is vital for questions on Article 26 and the balance between religious freedom and social reform. The case illustrates the judiciary’s role in interpreting constitutional morality versus public morality, a frequent theme in GS 4 ethics papers. Precedents cited (1954‑2004) provide a chronological framework for essay‑type answers on the evolution of religious‑freedom jurisprudence. Way Forward Future judgments are likely to refine the ERP test, possibly limiting the court’s theological reach and emphasizing legislative competence under Article 25(2). Aspirants should monitor how the bench reconciles gender equality with religious autonomy, as the outcome will shape policy on temple entry, caste‑based exclusions, and broader secular‑religious dynamics in India.